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State Responsibility and Assessment of
Liability for Damage Resulting from
Dumping Operations
GEORGE C. KASOULIDES*
The Contracting Members of the London Dumping Convention are
considering the establishment of a liability regime for dumping
operations. The obligation for the establishment of such a regime
is included in the provisions of the Convention and is linked with a
moratorium on dumping of radioactive waste. This article dis-
cusses general principles of state responsibility for environmental
protection and the specific obligations for states and individuals
included in the Convention. It examines evidence pointing to the
recognition of a need for a liability regime, the nature of liability
for dumping operations, and the associated issues of reparation
and compensation systems. The article concludes that the develop-
ment of a liability regime for all dumping activities is the next
necessary step to progress the effective application and interpreta-
tion of the convention, and it suggests a number of principles to be
taken into consideration for the development of such a regime.
* B.A. 1980 PANTIOS (Athens); LL.M. 1983, University of London; Ph.D. 1988,
University of London. Research Officer at London School of Economics; Sea Foundation
Ltd. Associate. This article is based on a study prepared for the Friends of the Earth
International for submission to the London Dumping Convention circulated under LDC
11/6/2 1988 and LDC 11/INF.2, 8 July. The views herein expressed represent the au-
thor's alone and do not represent the views of the Friends of the Earth International. The
author would like to express his gratitude to Dr. P. Birnie and Aline De Biavre for their
comments on an earlier draft version.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times there has been increased public awareness of the
hazards to human health and the environment posed by the wide
variety of wastes disposed at sea (especially the chemical and radio-
active substances), by sub-seabed disposal,1 and by incineration.'
Discussions and arguments on the disposal of radioactive waste have
been especially intense. International regulation of ocean dumping of
radioactive waste began in 1958, when the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1) declared: "Every
State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
dumping of radioactive wastes, taking into account any standards
and regulations which may be formulated by international authori-
ties."' Nevertheless, an international legal framework of regulation
was not created until 1972, when the Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter4 was
adopted. This convention, popularly known as the London Dumping
Convention (LDC), came into force in 1975, has been ratified by
sixty-two states, and plays an increasingly major and decisive role in
the control of marine pollution caused by dumping. Its regulations
are largely included in three Annexes: Annex I, labeled the "black
list," specifies materials that must not be dumped at sea except in
trace amounts; Annex II, the "grey list," covers materials dumped
under special provisions and strict regulations; and Annex III sets
out conditions for issuance of permits for the remaining materials
which is entrusted to national authorities.5
1. D. DEESE, NUCLEAR POWER AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE: A SUB-SEABED DIS-
POSAL OPTION? (1978); Curtis, Legality of Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive
Wastes Under the London Dumping Convention, 14 OCEAN DEv. INT'L L.J. 383 (1985);
Welsh, The London Dumping Convention and Sub-Seabed Disposal of Radioactive
Waste, 28 GERMANY Y.B. INT'L L. 322 (1985).
2. Lentz, Environmental Effects of Ocean Incineration - An Uncertain Science,
in REASONS FOR CONCERN 162 (Proceedings of the 2d North Sea Seminar 1986, 1987).
3. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 25(1), 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention]. For a histori-
cal analysis, especially for low-level radioactive waste, see Bewers & Garrett, Analysis of
the Issues Related to Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes, 11 MAR. POL'Y 105 (1987).
See also A. HUGUN, HISTORY OF LoW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL INTO THE
SEA (1983); Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The Obligation of Interna-
tional Cooperation to Protect the Marine Environment, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 623 (1981);
Haimbaugh, Protecting the Seas from Nuclear Pollution, 33 S.C.L. REV. 197 (1981).
4. London Dumping Convention, done Dec. 29, 1972, reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1293 (1972) [hereinafter LDC]. For general information on the LDC, see Bruce, The
London Dumping Convention, 1972: First Decade and Future, 6 OCEAN Y.B. 298
(1987); Duncan, The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dump-
ing of Wastes at Sea, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 229 (1974); Leitzell, The Ocean Dumping
Convention, A Hopeful Beginning, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 502 (1973); McManus, Ocean
Dumping: Standards in Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION 119 ( Kay & Jacobson eds. 1983).
5. LDC, supra note 4, at Annexes -III. For a special study prepared by the
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In 1983, at the Seventh Consultative Meeting, Kiribati and Nauru
proposed an outright ban on the dumping at sea of any radioactive
waste. Following a lengthy discussion, the Contracting Parties
agreed to a moratorium on further radioactive dumping, pending a
review by an independent panel of experts of the relevant scientific
and technical issues. This panel was established by the LDC, with
members nominated by the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the International Council of Scientific Unions. The scientific
panel produced a report in time for the Ninth Consultative Meeting
of the LDC in September 1985.6 In the analysis of this inconclusive
report, the moratorium on dumping was renewed for an indefinite
period pending further review along the lines expressed in Resolution
LDC.21(9), adopted on September 27, 1985. This Resolution not
only extended the existing moratorium on the dumping of low-level
radioactive wastes at sea, but also called upon the Contracting Par-
ties to the LDC "to develop, as envisaged in Article X [of the LDC],
procedures for the assessment of liability in accordance with the
principles of international law regarding State responsibility for
damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of
the environment resulting from dumping."8
Participants of the Tenth Consultative Meeting, which was held in
October 1986, decided to establish a group of legal experts to study
the implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea9 provisions on dumping, and LDC Article X referring to inter-
national responsibility and liability for marine environmental dam-
age resulting from dumping. This Ad Hoc Group of Legal Experts
on Dumping met for the first time in October 1987, and examined
papers submitted by Australia, l0 Nauru," and Spain.' 2 The Group
Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization referring extensively to the con-
tents and achievements of the convention and to all texts of regulations, guidelines, pro-
cedures, and criteria adopted by the Convention up to 1985, see I.M.O. Doc. LDC 9/
INF.2 (1985).
6. Report of Intersessional Activities relating to the Disposal of RadioactiveWastes at Sea, including the Final Report of the Scientific Review, LDC/9/4, June 24,
1985. See also Boehmer-Christiansen, An End to Radioactive Waste Disposal "at
Sea?," 10 MAR. POL'Y 119 (1986); Van Dyke, Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, 12
MAR. POL'Y 82, 84 (1988).
7. I.M.O. Doc. LDC.21(9) (1985).
8. Id.
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS
Convention].
10. I.M.O. Doc. LDC/LG. 3/INF.2 (1987).
11. I.M.O. Doc. LDC/IGPRAD 1/3/19 (1987).
also considered developments in other forums-especially regional
organizations-as well as the relevance of the nuclear conventions.
During the discussions, two divergent views appear to have emerged.
Some experts considered that by virtue of Paragraph seven of Reso-
lution LDC.21(9),13 the Group was given a clear mandate to develop
a regime of liability in accordance with Article X of the LDC, while
other experts considered that the need to produce a liability regime
was still very much an open issue. The latter experts felt that a lia-
bility regime was not needed or that it was premature to embark
upon the establishment of such a regime.' 4 As this view was sup-
ported by the majority, the Group failed to elaborate on the issues
put forward in the papers submitted, and the Contracting Parties to
the LDC were requested to "take note of the different views within
the Group on developing procedures for the assessment of liability
pursuant to article X of the LDC and take action as appropriate."' 5
The initiative taken at the Tenth Consultative Meeting to consider
appropriate procedures for the development of a liability regime is a
necessary step for the strengthening, and indeed implementation, of
the LDC. Furthermore, the elaboration of a liability regime for
dumping is a logical follow-up to the liability regimes already estab-
lished in a number of other environmental areas where activities in-
volving exceptional use to the environment are undertaken: notably,
those involving outer space, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and
the maritime transportation of oil. The obligations undertaken by
states in these areas include a duty of reparation, restitution, and
compensation vis-A-vis victims of accidents that could not be
prevented.' 6
The following analysis involves a substantive consideration of the
issues related to the establishment of a special liability regime and
the attendant obligation of the LDC's Contracting Parties to develop
rules on state responsibility for ocean dumping. This analysis is not
restricted to nuclear substances, but encompasses all ocean dumping
activities by the Contracting Parties of the LDC.17
12. I.M.O. Doc. LDC/IGPRAD 1/3/18 (1987).
13. See supra note 7.
14. LDC/LG 3/WP.1.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Finally, but not least important, the establishment of a liability regime is
clearly related to the issues raised in the moratorium on the dumping of nuclear waste
and rightly viewed as a "binding condition" for its termination. See I.M.O. Doc. LDC/
IGPRAD 1/3/18, Annex at 4.
17. This is not the first effort to address the issue of liability for transfer pollu-
tion. See Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the consideration of article 17 of the
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done
Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 544 (1974) [hereinafter Helsinki Convention]; Z.
BRODECKI, COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE To THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE BAL-
TIC SEA AREA (1987); S. KUWABARA, THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE PROTECTION OF THE
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II. ScoPE OF THE LDC PROVISION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
According to Article X of the LDC, the Contracting Parties must
develop procedures for the assessment of liability resulting from
dumping "in accordance with the principles of international law re-
garding State responsibility for environmental damage."18 The pur-
pose of this paper is to elaborate on principles of international envi-
ronmental law which are binding on all states, and to elaborate on
the corresponding rules of state responsibility.
A. Principles of Environmental Protection
The starting point for the construction of a liability regime for
ocean dumping is the principle of general international law sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas-one should use that belonging to one in
a manner which causes no damage to others. This "equality" of
rights and obligations is implied in the Preamble to the LDC,19 as
well as in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment. 20 Principle 21 recognizes that states have "the respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction."'" The same principle is in-
corporated in Article 194 of the LOS Convention. 2
Thus, it is widely accepted that in a system consisting of equal and
sovereign states, the freedom of independence enjoyed by each state
becomes restricted at that point at which it interferes with the cor-
relative exercise by other states of the same freedom. In the particu-
lar case of polluting activities, it is quite clear that action within the
territory of one state may adversely affect the environmental inter-
ests and natural resources of other states. For example, the flow of
water and the circulation of air ignore artificially imposed legal de-
MEDITERRANEAN AGAINST POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES (1984). For similar
efforts regarding the Mediterranean area, see Conference on the Protection of the Medi-
terranean Sea, done Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976) [hereinafter Barce-
lona Convention].
18. LDC, supra note 4, at art. 10.
19. LDC, supra note 4, at preamble.
20. U.N. Conf. on the Human Env't, 1972 U.N. Doc A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Principles]. See generally R.
CLARK & L. TIMBERLAKE, STOCKHOLM PLUS TEN: PROMISES, PROMISES? THE DECADE
SINCE THE 1972 UNCHE (1982); Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973); Strong, The United Nations and the Environ-
ment, 26 INT'L ORGAN. 169 (1972).
21. Stockholm Principles, supra note 20, at 1416.
22. See LOS Convention, supra note 9, at art. 194.
marcation lines, and environmental damage to any part of these may
not be restricted within the geographical zones of a state's
jurisdiction.
The acceptance of the principle of sic utere tuo as a principle of
public international law can be traced to the decision of the arbitral
tribunal in Trail Smelter 3 concerning damage caused in the United
States by fumes from a smelter located in Canada. The tribunal con-
cluded that
under the principles of international law ... no State has the right to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 24
Later, in Corfu Channel,2 5 the International Court of Justice de-
cided that Albania's responsibility for damage to British naval ships
and personnel caused by mines of unknown origin found within Al-
banian territorial waters was based on "every state's obligation not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states. 26
That an obligation to prevent harm operates as a principle of in-
ternational law is also implicit in the draft articles prepared by the
International Law Commission (ILC) on a regime of international
liability for injuries arising out of activities not prohibited by inter-
national law.27 Draft Article 1 specifies that liability for such injuries
applies "with respect to activities or situations which are within the
23. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
24. Id. at 1965. See also R. QUENTIN-BAXTER, 2ND REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
LIABILITY FOR INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES ARISING OUT oF ACTS NOT PROHIBITED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, SERIES OF REPORTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/346/ADD.I and 2 (1981), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N,
Sept. 1, 104-05 (1981), [hereinafter BAXTER ILC REPORTS]; B. SMITH, STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT - THE RULES OF DECIsION 73-74 (1988); A.
SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (PROTECTING THE GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES) 68 (1983); Read, The Trail Smelter
Dispute, I CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213 (1963); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail
Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259 (1971).
25. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949).
26. Id. at 22. This obligation was further acknowledged in the decision in the Lac
Lanoux Arbitration between Spain and France. Affaire de Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.)
(1957), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1963).
27. See generally Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out Of Acts Not Prohibited By International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3
(1985); Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of Interna-
tional Law - Some Basic Reflections on the International Law Commission's Work, 16
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1985); McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law Com-
mission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 206 (1983); Magraw,
Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of International Lia-
bility, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986); Pinto, Reflections on International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Act not Prohibited by International Law, 16
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1985).
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territory or control of a State, and which give rise to a physical con-
sequence affecting the use or enjoyment of areas within the territory
or the control of any other State." 8 Also, the International Law As-
sociation, in its 1982 Draft Montreal Rules of International Law
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, 9 defined the principle of sic
utere tuo as the customary foundation of the existing rules of inter-
national environmental law.30 Article 3 of these rules, entitled "Pre-
vention and abatement" states:
(1) Without prejudice to the operation of the rules relating to the reason-
able and equitable utilization of shared natural resources, States are in
their legitimate activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and control
transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused
in the territory of another State.
(2) Furthermore, States shall limit new and increased transfrontier pollu-
tion, below the requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article, to the lowest
level that may be reached by measures practicable and reasonable under
the circumstances.31
The obligation to prevent harm is not, however, limited to harm
arising out of territorial conduct. Conduct giving rise to the preven-
tive obligation can occur in relation to activities on the high seas, in
the air, in outer space, and in other areas beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction when there is no question of a territorial link.
More specifically, the pattern which emerges from a close examina-
tion of state practice, as well as the conventional law obligations of
states, is that a state remains accountable for the harmful conse-
quences of its conduct in any location if the state is in a position to
take preventive measures with respect to such conduct. This princi-
ple is supported by the LDC, where Contracting Parties pledge "to
take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the
dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to
human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage
amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea."32
This responsibility is reiterated in Draft Article 2(1)(c) of the ILC.
This draft provision states, with respect to "lawful activities," that
the jurisdiction of a state "in relation to the use or enjoyment of any
area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, extends to any matter
28. BAXTER ILC REPORTS, supra note 24, at 155.
29. The Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollu-
tion, Resolution No. 2/1982 on Legal Aspects of the Conservation of the Environment,
International Law Association, Report of the 60th Conference (1982) [hereinafter Mon-
treal Rules].
30. Id. at art. 3.
31. Id.
32. See LDC, supra note 4, at art. I.
in respect of which a right is exercised or an interest is asserted. '33
B. State Responsibility for the Acts of Organs of the State and
of Private Persons
"Responsibility" of a state means that an internationally wrongful
act committed by one state against another entails certain conse-
quences for the source state in the form of new obligations toward
the victim. An act is considered internationally wrongful if its author
violates an obligation established by custom or treaty in favor of an-
other state. 4 If a state commits such an act, defined by the ILC in
its Draft Article 1935 as an "international delict," the source state is
responsible only to the victim. Those acts which are more serious,
and which give rise to an aggravated degree of state responsibility
toward the international community as a whole, qualify as "interna-
tional crimes" affecting all states, and would create new rights and
obligations for all states. Paragraph 3 of the ILC's Article 19 con-
tains a list of acts which may constitute international crimes.36
1. Acts of Organs of the State
When the activities of an organ or agent of the state cause harm
to the territory of another state, and when the activities can, in law,
be attributed to that state, there is no limit to the state's obligation
to act to control the damage. This obligation extends to activities
conducted anywhere outside a state's territory, as long as that state
has the ability to exercise control over those activities. 7 A number of
international agreements clearly testify to the preeminence of state
33. BAXTER ILC REPORTS, supra note 24, at 155.
34. An internationally wrongful act can be committed either through action or
through omission. See Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship be-
tween Reponsibility and Damages, 185 RECUEIL DES COURs 7 (1984); Riphagen, State
Responsibility - New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 580-625 (Mc-
Donald & Johnston eds. 1986); Wolfrum, Internationally Wrongful Acts, 10 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 271 (1987).
35. The draft articles are published in the Annual Report to the General Assem-
bly for 1980. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 64, U.N. Doe. A/35/10, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1980 Add.1 (pt. 2).
36. Zemanek, Responsibility of States: General Principles, 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB. INT'L L. 362 (1987).
37. I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS-STATE RESPONSIBILITY -
PART 1 159 (1983); Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental
Damage by Private Persons, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 525, 528 (1980). See also Dupuy, Inter-
national Liability of States for Damage Caused By Transfrontier Pollution, in OECD.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1977); Goldie, Liability for Damage
and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L ComP. L.Q. 1220
(1965); Handl, International Liability of States for Marine Pollution, 21 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 85 (1983).
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responsibility in the "transnational" area. For instance, the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies"8 provides for the international responsibility of state par-
ties to the treaty for "national activities in outer space . . . whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities."3 9 Similarly, the 1972 Convention on Liability
for Damage caused by Objects Launched into Outer Space40 imposes
absolute liability on the "launching State," which is defined as in-
cluding "a State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched.41 Significantly, these conventions also impose interna-
tional liability on the controlling state for those harmful activities
undertaken by private organizations or individuals.
2. Acts of Private Persons
Not all harmful private conduct leads automatically and immedi-
ately to state responsibility.42 The obligation of the state is to exer-
cise "due diligence" 43 to prevent and punish private conduct which
38. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Space Treaty].
39. Id. at art. VI.
40. Convention on Liability for Damage caused by Objects Launched into Outer
Space, done Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2391, T.I.A.S. No. 762 [hereinafter Space Liabil-
ity Convention]. See generally Cheng, Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 83 (1979); Foster, The Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 10 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 335 (1966).
41. Space Liability Convention, supra note 40, at art. II.
42. According to Wolfrum, "the state is responsible only for the act of omission
of its organs where they are guilty of not having done everything within their power to
prevent the injurious act of private individual or to punish it suitably if it has occurred."
Wolfrum, supra note 34, at 271. See also Handl, supra note 37, at 528.
43. According to Baxter, liability
is envisaged as being largely ... the product of the duty of care or due dili-
gence, the pervasive primary rule that is approved, and explained with equal
facility, by the proponents of subjective and objective theories of responsibility.
At a certain point along the way, one must admit the influence of a modified
principle, more closely connected with the era of interdependence; for the duty
of care will have to acquire a new dimension before it can account convincingly
for such phenomena.
BAXTER ILC REPORTS, supra note 24, at 252. See also R. AGO., FIRST REPORT ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Annexes I-XXIII,
[1977] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 141, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217; id. at Annex XXIV,
[1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 193, U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/217/Add.2 (1971); F. GARCIA-
AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES To ALIENS (1974); Handl, supra note 37, at 525-65. See
would violate the state's international obligations if the state were
the actor (for example, obligations relating to oil pollution and
harmful nuclear activities)." Thus, conventions dealing with private
liability are often linked to a chain of state obligations forming part
of international efforts designed to prevent or minimize damage aris-
ing from a particular activity. Moreover, the conventional regimes do
not always distinguish the cases in which the conduct of activities is
in private hands from those in which the activities are carried out by
agencies of the state. In short, governments retain ultimate supervi-
sory functions and duties even when they channel liability to private
operators, including the duty to provide and guarantee
compensation.
C. Enforcement Powers of Contracting Parties to the LDC and
Implications for Liability
The provisions of the LDC clearly provide for the regulation of
any dumping by the Contracting Parties. 5 Elaborate provisions
cover a wide range of measures. Primarily, the provisions are for the
prevention of dumping and for the imposition of penalities for viola-
tions of the Convention's Article VII. Relatedly, considerable en-
forcement rights and obligations are attributed to Contracting Par-
ties. First, with respect to the state in whose territory the dumping
activity originates, each party shall take in its territory appropriate
measures (for example, instituting a permit system) to prevent and
punish conduct in contravention of the provisions of the
Convention.4
Second, a port state has the obligation to apply the Convention to
vessels in its ports loading matter to be dumped.47 Accordingly, the
loading-port state has the right to enforce the Convention upon ships
of non-Contracting Parties not only while they are in port, but even
after such vessels have left port. The loading-port state is thereby
able to prevent illegal ocean dumping or dumping in contravention of
the terms of license.
Third, Contracting Parties are permitted to enforce the Conven-
tion upon foreign vessels, aircraft, and fixed or floating platforms
which are under their coastal jurisdiction .4  This right of enforce-
generally 7 M. WHITEMAN, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1059-67 (1906); Dupuy,
Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability, in OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1977).
44. 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 738 (1967). This principle
was reaffirmed in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff' in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 30-33 (May 20, 1980).
45. LDC, supra note 4, at art. IV(1).
46. Id. at art. VII(2).
47. Id. at art. VII(1)(b).
48. Id. at art. VII(l)(c).
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ment includes the right to prevent foreign dumping in the exclusive
economic zone, or in the fisheries zone of the state, or on its conti-
nental shelf.
Fourth, the flag state is obliged to apply the Convention to vessels
and aircraft registered in its territory. 9 In fact, in cases where a
violation is committed on the high seas, enforcement lies primarily
with the flag state, with certain residual powers given to the loading-
port state. In addition, Contracting Parties agree to cooperate in the
development of procedures for the effective application of the Con-
vention on the high seas, including procedures for the reporting of
vessels and aircraft observed to be dumping in contravention of the
Convention.5"
In summary, competence for the issuing of dumping permits and
for the control of dumping operations lies with the loading-port state.
The loading-port state is assisted by the state of registry of the ship
or aircraft, and by the state having coastal jurisdiction. It would,
therefore, seem fair to suggest that failure of a state to exercise due
diligence to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the Con-
vention will result in state responsibility, even if the conduct in ques-
tion was actually committed by private individuals.
Provisions similar to the foregoing rights and obligations under the
LDC are included in Articles 210 and 216 of the LOS Convention
concerning the international seabed area.51 Furthermore, Article 139
of this convention, which defines the rights and obligations of states
with respect to the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdic-
tion, explicitly specifies:
State Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the
Area, whether carried out by State Parties or State enterprises, or natural
or juridical persons which possess the nationality of State Parties or are
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in con-
formity with this Part. The same responsibility applies to international or-
ganizations for activities in the Area carried out by such organizations. 2
Finally, Recommendation 86 of the Action Plan for the Human En-
vironment, adopted at the Stockholm Conference, stipulates that
states should "ensure that ocean dumping by their national any-
where ...is controlled."153
49. Id. at art. VII(a)(a).
50. Id. at art. VII(3).
51. See LOS Convention, supra note 9, at 1266.
52. Id.
53. Stockholm Principles, supra note 20, at 1454.
To conclude, general principles of international law, as well as
state practice discussed in this section, suggest that a Contracting
Party to the LDC is responsible not only for its own dumping activi-
ties, but also for unlawful dumping activities by private individuals.
The later responsibility, however, results only if there is lack of due
care and diligence on the part of the state. In a situation of concur-
rent state jurisdiction, the state which exercises effective control over
the dumping activity is the one incurring international liability.
I1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGFUL ACTS AND LAWFUL
ACTIVITIES
A. Origin and Rationale
Those rules and obligations, the breach of which can be a source
of responsibility, may be described as "primary." In contrast, the
liability rules which the Contracting Parties are requested to develop
in accordance with Article X may be described as "secondary," inas-
much as they are aimed at determining the legal consequences of
failure to fulfill obligations established by the "primary" rules.54 The
codification of rules of state responsibility has been on the agenda of
the ILC since 1956.55 During the course of its work on state respon-
sibility for internationally wrongful acts, the Commission decided in
1970 that there exists an additional category of activities deserving
independent and special treatment with respect to the question of
responsibility. This category was considered to include certain lawful
activities, and was restricted almost exclusively to activities causing
transboundary environmental harm. According to the Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter, the purpose of the ILC is to "identify rules
and procedures which can safeguard national interest against losses
or injuries arising from activities and situations that are in principle
legitimate, but that may entail adverse transboundary effects."5
Thus, the ILC agreed to consider distinguishing responsibility for in-
ternationally wrongful acts from responsibility for the injurious con-
sequences of activities which are lawful.
54. Combacau & Alland, "Primary" and "Secondary" Rules in the Law of State
Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 81
(1985).
55. F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 43, at 1. The tasks of codifying rules of state
responsibility is divided into three parts: (i) The origin of international responsibility (the
first reading has been completed); (ii) content, forms, and degrees of international re-
sponsibility (being considered now), see W. Riphagen, Preliminary Report on the Con-
tents Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 107
(1980) [hereinafter Riphagen ILC Reports]; and (iii) implementation of international
responsibility and dispute settlement.
56. BAXTER ILC REPORTS, supra note 24, at 105. See generally Akehurst, supra
note 27; Handl, supra note 27; Pinto, supra note 27.
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B. Wrongful Acts under the LDC
According to general international law, a state is responsible for
its act or omission causing injury to another state when such act or
omission constitutes an internationally wrongful act. In consequence,
it is liable for the damage incurred. Thus, the Draft Articles on state
responsibility prepared by the ILC define the basis of international
responsibility in the following terms:
Draft Article I
Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts.
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international re-
sponsibility of that State.
Draft Article 3
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State.
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when: (a) Conduct
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under inter-
national law; and (b) That conduct constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State.
Also, Draft Article 19 on international crimes and international
delicts defines a list of acts constituting international crimes, which
includes, inter alia, "a serious breach of an international obligation
of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of
the atmosphere or of the seas.
The obligations and duties of the Contracting Parties to the LDC
stipulate the following:
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties
shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form
or condition except as otherwise specified below:
a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is
prohibited;
b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires
a prior special permit;
c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general
permit.
2. Any permit shall be issued only after careful consideration of all the
factors set forth in Annex III, including prior studies of the characteristics
of the dumping site as set forth in Sections B and C of that Annex.
3. No provision of this Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a
Contracting Part from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is concerned, the
dumping of wastes or other matter not mentioned in Annex I. That Party
shall notify such measures to the Organization.58
In other words, a breach of a state's obligation under the LDC vis-
57. See supra note 35.
58. LDC, supra note 4, at art. IV.
a-vis other parties includes: (a) The dumping of wastes or other mat-
ter listed in the "black list"; (b) the dumping of wastes or other
material listed in the "grey list" without a prior special permit; and
(c) the dumping of any wastes or matter without a prior general
permit or without due consideration of the guidelines set forth in
Annex III to the LDC. An LDC Contracting Party is also violating
its international treaty obligations if it does not conform with the
provisions of Article VI for the granting of general and special per-
mits, for controlling the dumping operations through record keeping
and publicizing of permits, and for the scientific monitoring of the
condition of the seas as to the effects of dumping.59 Finally, as dis-
cussed in Section II.C above, a Contracting Party to the LDC is
responsible for wrongful acts committed by private individuals if it
did not exercise due diligence in preventing and punishing such acts.
The burden of proof in such cases lies with the source state.
C. Lawful Dumping Activities under the LDC and the Concept
of Ultrahazardous Activities
Dumping is, nevertheless, not altogether forbidden, and Con-
tracting Parties may permit the dumping of waste and other matter
in compliance with the strict regulations and guidelines of the Con-
vention. Lawful dumping activities include: (a) The dumping of
wastes and other matter listed in the "grey list," subsequent to the
awarding of a special permit; (b) dumping of all wastes and matter
not included in the "black list" or "grey list" after the award of a
general permit in accordance with Annex III; and (c) dumping in
compliance with the provisions of Article V. Article V allows dump-
ing in the following instances: Cases of force majeure caused by
stress of weather; cases where there is a danger to human life or a
threat to the safety of vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other property;
and cases of emergency issuance of a special permit for the dumping
of "black list" substances.6" As these activities are lawful, no liabil-
ity can, in principle, be attributed to the Contracting Parties or to
private individuals simply for conducting such activities. Neverthe-
less, this is not to deny the possibility of harm and subsequent incur-
rence of liability if the dumping activities are abnormally dangerous.
The idea behind liability for abnormally dangerous, yet lawful, ac-
tivities indeed relates to the concept of ultrahazardous activities.
These are activities which, because of their inherently harmful na-
ture and attendant potential for damage, may result in a substantial
change in the natural environment of another state or significant
59. Id. at art. VI.
60. Id. at. art. V.
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transnational pollution of air or water." Ultrahazardous activities
may be defined as all activities involving a risk of serious damage on
an international scale which cannot be eliminated even by the exer-
cise of utmost care. As defined by Jenks,6' the most important char-
acteristic of such activities is a low probability of occurrence com-
bined with a severe magnitude of transnational damage if
materialized. Thus,
[i]t does not imply that the activity is ultrahazardous in the sense that there
is a high degree of probability that the hazard will materialize, but rather
that the consequences in the exceptional and perhaps quite improbable
event of the hazard materializing may be so far-reaching that special rules
are necessary if serious injuries and hardship are to be avoided."3
Draft Article 1 for the Codification of Rules Concerning Liability
for Lawful Acts goes further than this approach, and does not even
attribute any qualifications to liability for lawful activities. Rather, it
assigns liability for all activities "which give rise or may give rise to
a physical consequence affecting the use or enjoyment of areas
within the territory or control of any other State."64
In view of the above considerations, it is suggested that Con-
tracting Parties and private individuals undertaking lawful dumping
activities are liable for all water pollution, air pollution, and harm to
the marine environment and its natural resources, as well as harm to
any interests of other states caused by such activities.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF LIABILITY
FOR DUMPING ACTIVITIES
A. Evidence Pointing to the Recognition of a Need for a
Liability Regime
Article X of the LDC, which imposes upon Contracting Parties
the obligation to develop procedures for the assessment of liability
for dumping, is supported by other statements of a more general
character, especially Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration. Ac-
cording to Principle 22, "[s]tates shall co-operate to develop further
the international law regarding liability and compensation for the
61. B. SMITH, supra note 24, at 119.
62. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 177
RECUEIL DES COURS 105 (1966). See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 37, at 285-86; Gol-
die, supra note 37, at 1221; Handl, supra note 37, at 101; Kelson, State Responsibility
and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV. L.J. 197, 206-09 (1972).
63. Jenks, supra note 62, at 107.
64. BAXTER ILC REPORTS, supra note 24, at 155. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 27-28.
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by ac-
tivities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction. 65 The same principle is reiterated in Article
235 of the LOS Convention:
1. States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They
shall be liable in accordance with international law.
2. States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their
legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in re-
spect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by natural
or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
3. With the objective of assuring prompt and adequate compensation in re-
spect of all damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States
shall co-operate in the implementation of existing international law and the
further development of international law relating to responsibility and lia-
bility for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the settle-
ment of related disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development of cri-
teria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as
compulsory insurance or compensation funds."
The need for the formulation of a liability regime is also an estab-
lished principle of regional conventions. These conventions require
member states to cooperate in the formulation and adoption of ap-
propriate rules and procedures in respect of liability and compensa-
tion for damage from pollution of the marine environment.6 7 More-
over, the need for close cooperation among parties to the LDC and
parties to those regional conventions concerned with dumping is rec-
ognized in Article VIII of the LDC.e8 There are already three re-
gional dumping agreements in force: the 1972 Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Air-
craft, for states bordering on the North Sea and the North-East At-
lantic region; 9 the 1976 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of
65. Stockholm Principles, supra note 20.
66. LOS Convention, supra note 9, at art. 235.
67. Barcelona Convention, supra note 17, at art. 12; Helsinki Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 17; Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of
the Marine Environment from Pollution, art. XIII, done Apr. 23, 1978, reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 516 (1978), 17 LL.M. 501, 511 (1978) [hereinafter Kuwait Convention]; Con-
vention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the West and Central African Region, art. 15, done Mar. 23, 1981,
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 729 (1981) [hereinafter Abidjan Convention]; Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, done
Nov. 12, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 696 (1981) [hereinafter Lima Convention]; The
Convention for the Protection and Developing of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, done Mar. 24, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 696 (1983) [hereinafter
Cartagena Convention]; Convention for the Protection, Management and Development
of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, done June 21,
1985, UNEP Regional Seas Convention (1985) [hereinafter Nairobi Convention]; Con-
vention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pa-
cific Region, done Nov. 25, 1986, UNEP Publication (1986) [hereinafter Noumea
Convention].
68. LDC, supra note 4, at art. VIII.
69. The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
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the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft;"0 and
the 1986 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific
Region by Dumping.7 1 Although no attempts have been made yet to
develop rules and procedures relating to state responsibility and lia-
bility under the above-mentioned regional conventions, it may rea-
sonably be expected that the development and adoption of such rules
and procedures by the LDC will encourage the adoption of similar
measures at the regional level.
The undertaking of such an initiative and the attendant drafting
of the necessary rules and procedures undoubtedly entail a number
of legal and technical difficulties. The Contracting Parties may,
therefore, be well advised to seek insights from developments in
other environmental fields, especially the deliberations of the ILC on
international liability for ultrahazardous activities, as well as the
ILC's work on codification of rules of state responsibility. Following
an agreement on this question of state responsibility and liability, the
key issues to be considered include the nature of liability for dump-
ing activities, and the assessment of compensation. These will be dis-
cussed next.
B. The Nature of Liability for Dumping Activities
There are two main conflicting schools of thought on the nature of
state responsibility. The first accepts fault as the central constituent
of liability. The second, a theory of "objective liability," accepts cau-
sation as the central constituent. According to the latter and most
prominent view,72 the responsibility of a state flows from the breach
of an international obligation caused by an act or omission attributa-
ble to that state. Breach of an international obligation is not, how-
ever, linked to subjective notions of intent or negligence. Rather, in
order to establish "objective" responsibility, there need only occur a
violation of an international obligation, the prerequisites to such vio-
Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 15, 1972, 119 U.K.T.S. (1975) [hereinafter Oslo
Convention].
70. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dump-
ing from Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976)
[hereinafter Mediterranean Dumping Protocol].
71. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by
Dumping, done Nov. 25, 1986, UNEP Regional Seas Conventions (1986) [hereinafter
Noumea Protocol].
72. The ILC nowhere refers to fault in its draft articles on the responsibility of
state for wrongful acts. For the definition of a wrongful act, see LDC, supra note 4, at
draft art. 13.
lation being determined by the content of the specific obligation. Sig-
nificantly, recent practice evidences that strict or "no-fault" liability
(that is, liability determined without reference to wrongful intent or
lack of diligence of the state) has secured a place in customary inter-
national law with respect to ultrahazardous activities. 73 The underly-
ing principle of strict liability is that the party which acts or controls
an activity, and not the injured party, should bear the burden of
proof, and should demonstrate the harmless effects of the activity.
There is ample evidence of the emergence of a doctrine of strict
liability in a significant number of multilateral conventions. All con-
ventions relating to civil liability for injuries arising out of nuclear
activities provide for a strict liability regime.74 Liability is estab-
lished in each case simply on the fact of causation of harm: the in-
jured party does not need to show intent or negligence. Strict liabil-
ity also appears in the two private law conventions directed at the
protection of the sea against oil pollution by ships. The 1969 Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 5
establishes a regime of limited but guaranteed strict liability, and is
supplemented by the 1971 International Convention on the Estab-
lishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 6 which
functions as an additional and direct source of compensation. The
doctrine of strict civil liability, combined with the principles of lim-
ited and compulsory insurance, is also incorporated into the 1977
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Resulting from Ex-
ploration for and Exploitation of Sea-bed Mineral Resources."
Although these conventions channel liability to private individuals
(such as operators and owners of nuclear facilities and vessels,
tanker owners and oil companies, offshore oil and gas rig operators
73. Corfu Channel, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9, 1949); Trail
Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1911 (1941); Goldie, Con-
cepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Terms of Relative
Exposure to Risk, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 175 (1985).
74. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, done May 21,
1963, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963) [hereinafter Vienna Liability Convention]; Brus-
sels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, done May 25, 1962,
I.A.E.A. Legal Series No. 4 (rev. ed. 1976), reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963)
[hereinafter Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships Convention]; Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, done July 29, 1960, I.A.E.A. Legal Se-
ries No. 4 (rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter Paris Liability Convention]; Convention Supple-
mentary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, done Jan. 31, 1964 [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention].
75. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1969), U.K.T.S. 78 (1975) [hereinafter CCL].
76. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 284
(1971) [hereinafter Fund Convention].
77. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Resulting from Exploration for
and Exploitation of Sea-bed Mineral Resources, done May 1, 1977; A. Kiss, SELECTED
MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 474 (1983).
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and owners, and carriers and shippers of hazardous and noxious sub-
stances other than oil), it is quite clear that states have subjected
themselves, and not only private individuals, to the consequences of
the strict liability regime. More specifically, the legal context of
these conventions is private civil liability, but the consequences of a
strict liability regime might lead to responsibility at an international
level involving states.
This article asserts that state responsibility should arise in any
case where compensation by a private operator or owner is precluded
due to the state's failure to perform its treaty obligations, especially
for failing to require adequate financial security or failing to enact
effective substantive and procedural legislation to ensure adequate
compensation. Significantly, certain treaties on nuclear liability sup-
port this approach. The Brussels Convention on the Liability of Op-
erators of Nuclear Ships7 and the Vienna Liability Convention 9 ex-
plicitly provide for liability on the part of the state that controls
private operators of nuclear facilities if the private operators and
their insurers are unable to satisfy claims for compensation. Further-
more, Article II of the Space Liability Convention specifies that "a
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight."80 It also provides that states are liable for activi-
ties of private operators, and this liability is strict liability, since the
only exoneration is gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the
part of the victim." Finally, after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union's Cosmos 954 satellite over Canadian territory, the Canadian
claim was phrased in terms both of the Space Liability Convention
and customary international law.
The principle of absolute liability applies to fields of activities having in
common a high degree of risk. It is repeated in numerous international
agreements and is one of "the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations" (article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice). Accordingly, this principle has been accepted as a general principle of
international law.8 2
78. See Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships Convention, supra note 74, at
art. III.
79. Vienna Liability Convention, supra note 74, at art. VII(l).
80. Space Liability Convention, supra note 40, at art. II.
81. Id. at art. VI.
82. Letter from Dept. of External Affairs to the USSR Ambassador, Plus An-
nexes, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 899 (1979). The ultimate settlement of the claim neither
conceded nor denied the basis of liability. Protocol between the Government of Canada
and the Government of USSR, done Apr. 2, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 689 (1981).
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is suggested that the civil lia-
bility conventions are clear evidence of the acceptance of the rule of
strict state liability for the international consequences of activities
adversely affecting the environment. Two basic categories of injury
appear to trigger international strict liability for dumping activities.
The first consists of harm arising out of the fault of either the state
or the private operator, in the sense of wrongful intent or failure to
exercise due diligence. The second category relates to activities de-
fined as ultrahazardous. Under the LDC, ultrahazardous activities
are characterized as unlawful, and therefore prohibited, even in the
absence of harm or prior to proof of harm. Thus a categorical prohi-
bition of such activities is implied.8" On the other hand, a state's
strict and absolute liability for lawful activities in the future does not
imply total prohibition of such activities, provided that the activities
no longer produce actual injury, that reparation has been made, and
that measures have been taken to prevent future occurrence.
V. REPARATION AND COMPENSATION
A. Principles of Reparation and Compensation
The legal consequence of the breach of an international obligation
may be the creation of a duty to make adequate reparation. In the
language of the Permanent Court of Justice in Chorzbw Factory,
the essential principle contained in the notion of an illegal act-a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by
the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possi-
ble, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.84
Reparation refers to a variety of remedial measures which an offend-
ing state might be required to take. These measures are summarized
in the ILC's draft articles on state responsibility:
Draft Article 6
1. The injured State may require the State which has committed an inter-
nationally wrongful act to:(a) discontinue the act, release and return the persons and objects held
through such act, and prevent continuing effects of such act; and(b) apply such remedies as are provided for in its internal law; and
(c) provide appropriate guarantees against repetition of the act.
2. To the extent that it is materially impossible to act in conformity with
paragraph 1(c), the injured State may require the State which has commit-
83. LDC, supra note 4, at art. IV(1)(a).
84. Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 13, at 47. See generally I. BROWNLIE, supra note 37, at 457-64; F. GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 43; M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1937); 8
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1199-1216 (1967); Mann, The Conse-
quences of an International Wrong in International and National Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1976-77).
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ted the internationally wrongful act to pay to it a sum of money correspond-
ing to the value which a re-establishment of the situation as it existed
before the breach would bear.85
Thus, the first form of reparation is the duty to discontinue the
conduct constituting a breach of obligation, combined with the provi-
sion of appropriate guarantees against repetition of the conduct. The
second form of reparation is restitution, which is the obligation to
eliminate the effects of the breach, and to restore the situation to its
initial state. The third form of reparation is pecuniary compensation,
which arises when restitution is practically impossible or insufficient.
According to Chorzbw Factory:
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum correspond-
ing to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need
be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution
in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to
international law.
8 6
In practice, the selection of the appropriate form of reparation in a
particular case depends on the facts of the case, the specific nature
of the breach of obligation, and the extent of the consequences of the
breach. It is suggested that with respect to ocean dumping, measures
imposed as restitution should include, as a first priority, removal of
the offending dumped matter and restoration of the affected area to
its initial state. In addition, compensation should be paid for dam-
ages suffered as a result of the contravention.
B. . Joint Responsibility
In the course of dumping activities, a number of operators might
use the same dumping site, or sites in close proximity to each other,
thereby giving rise to the issue of joint liability and compensation . 7
The Space Liability Convention provides an example of joint respon-
sibility, specifying that states jointly participating in the launch of a
space object "shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage
caused.""8 States deemed to be jointly participating in a launch in-
clude states which launch or procure the launch, as well as states
from whose territory or facility the launch occurs.
85. Riphagen ILC Reports, supra note 55, Fourth Report, art. 6, Doc. A/CN.4/
380, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N at 15 (1984).
86. Factory at Chorzbw, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47.
87. For treatment of the issue of joint responsibility see I. BROWNLIE, supra note
37, at 456; B. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44.
88. Space Liability Convention, supra note 40, at art. V.
Another example of joint responsibility is provided by an earlier
version of the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) 1984
Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (Draft
HNS Convention),8" which proposed a system of joint and several
liability for carriers and shippers of wastes. This approach was con-
templated by the IMO's Legal Committee, in view of the fact that
an important element of risk from shipment of dangerous cargoes
derived not from transportation practices, but from the inherently
harmful nature of these cargoes. In addition, the Committee recog-
nized the difficulties involved in identifying the individual shippers of
different consignments on the same vessel, as well as the problems of
accurately assessing potential danger posed by the cargoes.90
It is suggested that, in principle, a party injured by dumping activ-
ities should be entitled to claim compensation from all those whose
dumping contributed to the damage. In those cases where the
sources of damage are inseparable, each participating party should
be responsible for paying compensation for the total damage suf-
fered, irrespective of the actual quantity dumped by the operator in
question. However, an alternative to a strict system of joint and sev-
eral responsibility could be a "staged" system of shared liability. The
obligation to pay compensation would not be expressed as a single
"flat" amount, but would be "layered" according to multiple,
"staged" amounts of compensation. Such a system would, of course,
need to be combined with a more exclusive channeling of liability.
This system could, for instance, involve a two-tier approach, as was
envisaged in the IMO's Draft HNS Convention9' involving a pri-
mary liability of the shipowner and an excess ("residual") liability of
the shipper. Obviously, the choice in favor or against a particular
system of joint responsibility would need to take account of the im-
plications for both the availability and cost of insurance.
C. Limited v. Unlimited Liability
The existing conventions on civil liability arising out of nuclear
activities and the maritime transportation of oil provide for limited
but strict liability, combined with compulsory insurance.9 2 These
89. Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Car-
riage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO Doc. LEG. CONF. G/3, Jan.
13, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 148 (1984) [hereinafter Draft HNS Convention]. See
Bi~vre, Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 17 J. MAR. L. COMM. 61 (1982).
90. For recent developments in this area, see Certain Call for Draft HNS, 9
HAZARDOUS CARGO BULL. 9 (1988-89).
91. Draft HNS Convention, supra note 89, at art. 6.
92. See generally Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollu-
tion, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1970).
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conventions channel liability to the operator of the activity, and their
limits on liability reflect a realization that most operators' capacity
to pay compensation is not consistent with the actual scale of the
damage. In contrast, the Space Liability Convention, which imposes
absolute and unlimited liability on the launching state, provides that:
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for dam-
age under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with interna-
tional law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such
reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural orjuridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is
presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred.
93
The issue, therefore, is whether the extent of international strict
liability should be the same for all types and degrees of damage, or
whether the extent of liability should depend on the degree of loss
only. ILC's Draft Article 19 on state responsibility for international
crimes and international delicts suggests that the regime should vary
according to the seriousness of damage, and, in particular, refers to
"massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas."'8 4 In view of the
above observations it may be suggested that a state should be subject
to unlimited liability for damage resulting from: (i) the fault or in-
tent of the state with respect to both unlawful and lawful dumping
under the LDC; and (ii) the failure of the state to exercise due dili-
gence to prevent dumping of substances in Annex I ("black list")
and dumping of substances in Annex II ("grey list") without a spe-
cial permit. Furthermore, a state should be subject to limited liabil-
ity for damage resulting from the failure of the state to exercise due
diligence to prevent all other types of unlawful dumping (for exam-
ple, dumping without a general permit or dumping without proper
record keeping), as well as all other types of lawful dumping.
It is not suggested that state liability would provide an autono-
mous solution to the problem of ocean dumping. On the contrary, it
should be regarded as complementary to private liability. The latter
must be preserved in accordance with the traditional principle of re-
sponsibility involving a congruence of legal and operational responsi-
bility, and in accordance with the "polluter pays" principle in terms
of damage compensation (as distinct from prevention, cleaning, and
reparation costs).
Liability of private operators, then, should be strict liability across
the board, meaning that operators will be strictly liable for "sudden"
93. Space Liability Convention, supra note 40, at art. 10.
94. See supra note 35, at art. 19.
incidents of environmental damage, as well as for "gradual" pollu-
tion. This regime would be in accordance with the strict nature of
the existing regulatory regime for ocean dumping in the preventive
field. Private operators should, nevertheless, enjoy limited liability
with respect to both unlawful and lawful dumping activities. These
provisions would take account of practical problems of individual sol-
vency or financial capacity, as well as the ultimate legal responsibil-
ity retained by states concerning supervisory functions.
To conclude, it is suggested that limited liability of private opera-
tors, and limited liability of states with respect to lesser forms of
unlawful dumping and all forms of lawful dumping, is justified pro-
vided that existing preventive regulations are kept under close review
for their short-term and long-term adverse environmental effects,
and that they are upgraded as soon as environmental damage is sus-
pected. Obviously, the envisaged restructuring of the Annexes to the
Convention will be of key importance to the assessment of liability.95
D. Compensation Systems
Existing civil conventions regulating liability employ various types
of compensation systems to ensure adequate recovery by victims.
These systems may be described by three broad categories: (1) Inter-
national compensation funds financed from direct contributions by
states; (2) international mutual guarantee funds financed by groups
of potential polluters; and (3) international guarantee funds financed
by private individuals under compulsory insurance schemes.
An example of an international compensation fund appears in the
Brussels Supplementary Convention.96 Under this Convention, each
Contracting Party guarantees compensation for transfrontier nuclear
damage exceeding the compensation ceiling of the Paris Nuclear
Act. 7 In addition, a fund jointly financed by the Contracting Parties
provides a collective guarantee of compensation for nuclear damage
over and above the compensation to be paid by each Contracting
State and the operator therein. 8
The Member States .of the Barcelona Convention99 have also ac-
knowledged the need for the establishment of an interstate guarantee
fund, and to this end adopted Resolution 4, which proposes that "a
study should be made of the possibility of establishing an inter-State
Guarantee Fund for the Mediterranean Sea Area and that the study
should be entrusted to a Committee of experts from the Contracting
95. Kasoulides, LDC Black/Grey Lists Reviewed, 19 MAR. POL. BULL. 504(1988).
96. Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 74.
97. Id. at art. VII.
98. Id.
99. Barcelona Convention, supra note 17.
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Parties to the Convention." 00
An international mutual guarantee fund is the system adopted by
the Fund Convention."'0 Individual compensation funds supported by
compulsory insurance are established, inter alia, by the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage0 2 and the
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Resulting from Ex-
ploration for and Exploitation of Sea-bed Mineral Resources. 0 3
In the case of ocean dumping and incineration activities, however,
damage to the environment may arise not so much as the result of a
catastrophic accident, but rather the slow release ("gradual" pollu-
tion) of radioactive or other harmful substances to the marine envi-
ronment. Liability might, therefore, arise not only during the dump-
ing activity (which includes loading, transportation, and disposal),
but after the dumping has been carried out. Moreover, dumping ac-
tivities have a continuing character since they tend to be concluded
in the same designated sites, and their repercussions may, in terms
of gradual pollution, expand over a long period of time.
This is not to say that the risk of an accident during the stages of
loading, carriage, and disposal of dumping material is not substan-
tial. Thus, it is suggested that operators be requested to establish
special funds for compensation guaranteed by insurance. According
to the precedent established in the Convention on Liability of Opera-
tors of Nuclear Ships, 04 the operator responsible for dumping activi-
ties should be exclusively liable in the first instance for accidental
damage. 0 5 However, in the case of slow release of hazardous sub-
stances into the marine environment, the diversity of the dumpsites
used, the longevity of certain wastes, and the accumulation of waste
in neighboring or joint dumpsites may make it very difficult to estab-
lish the origin of damage. Thus, identifying the party or parties re-
sponsible, and determining the corresponding state or private respon-
sibility, may be nearly impossible in some cases.
A solution to this problem might be the establishment of two types
of state funds. The first fund would guarantee compensation over
100. The recommendation was set by the Intergovernental Meeting on the Pro-
tection of the Mediterranean. See Action Plan for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Basin, convened by the Executive Director of UNEP in Barcelona, Jan. 28, 1975, re-
printed in S. KUWABARA, supra note 17, Annex I, at 143-47.
101. Fund Convention, supra note 76, at art. 2.
102. CCL, supra note 75, at art. IV.
103. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Resulting From Exploration
for and Exploitation of Sea-bed Mineral Resources, supra note 77, at art. 3.
104. Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ship Convention, supra note 74.
105. Id. at preamble.
and above the ceiling on private operators' liability for damage
caused during or in the aftermath of the dumping activity. The sec-
ond fund would compensate for "unindentifiable" damage that is se-
riously suspected to be caused by dumped materials. This fund
would cover damages such as general degradation of the environ-
mental quality of the seas, depletion of fishing stocks, and depriva-
tion of amenities. This fund could be financed at the international
level by charges collected from all major sources of dumping. Its
resources could also be used to monitor the deterioration of dumped
wastes (especially those subject to strict regulation for monitoring),
to undertake the restitution of the environment, and to ensure that
environmental damage from dumping activities will not be repeated.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Development of rules and procedures for the assessment of liabil-
ity for dumping activities in accordance with the principles of inter-
national law regarding state responsibility for environmental damage
is the obligation embedded in Article X of the LDC. The next step
to progress is the effective application and interpretation of the LDC
provisions. This obligation is supported by both the general princi-
ples of international law and customary state practice regarding
state responsibility and liability for internationally wrongful acts.
Furthermore, the ILC, which has been working on the codification of
rules of state responsibility for many years, is considering whether
the strict liability of states should also extend to the injurious conse-
quences of activities which are lawful, but which inherently cause
transnational damage (ultrahazardous activities).
The adoption of Resolution LDC.2(9) demonstrates the determi-
nation of the Contracting Parties to the LDC not to resume dumping
of low-level radioactive material before the adoption of an adequate
and comprehensive regime for the attribution of liability. In the light
of the legal analysis presented in this study, the following proposals
should also be taken into consideration by the Contracting Parties of
the LDC.
Competence for the control of dumping activities lies with state
authorities. Fault or intent of a state, or its failure to exercise due
diligence to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the
LDC, will result in state responsibility for the international adverse
effects on persons, property, or the environment, even if the conduct
was by private individuals. The effect of this state responsibility re-
sulting from the state's ultimate supervisory functions is that, in the
case of unlawful dumping activities, the source state is strictly and
absolutely liable not only for its own acts, but also for the acts of
private individuals. This liability of the state is also unlimited, ex-
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cepting cases where lesser forms of unlawful dumping have occurred
through no fault or wrongful intent of the state.
In the case of lawful dumping activities, Contracting Parties to the
LDC are strictly and absolutely liable for environmental damage by
virtue of the control principle, as well as because of the inherently
harmful nature of ocean dumping. Nevertheless, they may limit their
liability provided there was no fault or intent on their part.
Private operators are strictly, but limitedly, liable for any damage
resulting from either unlawful dumping or lawful activities, in accor-
dance with the traditional principle of rsponsibility, as well as the
"polluter pays" principle. The attribution of private liability in the
case of lawful acts is justified in view of the inherently harmful na-
ture of ocean dumping.
Due to the particular nature of dumping activities, a "layer" com-
pensation system is recommended. This system could take the fol-
lowing form: (a) Establishment of an individual compensation fund,
supported by a compulsory insurance scheme, to cover accidents dur-
ing the stages of loading, carriage, and disposal of waste; (b) estab-
lishment of a state fund to guarantee compensation for damage ex-
ceeding the liability ceiling for private operators; (c) establishment
of a state fund to compensate for damage over and above the limit of
private liability for gradual pollution occurring during or in the af-
termath of dumping; and (d) establishment of an interstate fund to
compensate unindentifiable environmental damage, possibly financed
from the international collection of charges from all major dumping
sources.

